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Abstract 
Fixed-term contracts are often considered a key policy tool for increasing employment. As we 
show that contract limitation lowers job satisfaction using data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel study, we detect a drawback of promoting temporary employment that has 
not been identified so far. We find that the “honeymoon-hangover” effect of a new job must 
be taken into account to reveal this result. We examine reasons why employees suffer from 
temporary contracts and analyse the “Flexicurity” idea of compensating workers with 
security. Our findings contribute to research on workers’ well-being as well as to the debate 
on labour market flexibilisation.  
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During the last decades, many countries tried to improve the employment prospects of 
involuntarily unemployed people by mitigating employment protection legislation. The recent 
economic crisis in Europe has also revitalized claims for such flexibilisation policies. In 
flexible labour markets, employers are able to adjust faster to demand changes than in 
regulated labour markets, which, for instance, foster permanent contracts and make it difficult 
to dismiss workers. The effects of flexible labour markets on (un-)employment are 
controversial among both policy makers and economists. Until now, labour market research 
has not come to an unambiguous assessment (e.g. OECD 2004, 2011). 
One key element of labour market deregulation is the promotion of fixed-term contracts. 
Beyond its potential impact on unemployment, however, this measure may also affect the 
welfare of the employed. Many workers who would have a permanent contract in a regulated 
labour market may suffer from contract limitation in a flexible labour market. If true, this 
negative consequence of flexible labour markets has to be considered when comparing the 
cost and benefits of allowing temporary employment. When fixed-term contracts cause 
considerable welfare losses among the employed but do not help the unemployed to find jobs 
and, hence, do not increase their welfare, this flexibilisation measure is not recommendable. 
If, however, the unemployed benefit from a flexible labour market while no other group is 
affected negatively, the policy recommendation should be flexibilisation without hesitation.  
In this study, we take a step towards an assessment of the welfare cost of employment 
contract limitation. Thereby, we follow the idea that job satisfaction constitutes a valid 
measure of on-the-job utility (e.g. Frey 2008). Previous empirical research on the relation of 
contract limitation and workers’ well-being shows no clear pattern. Reviews characterise the 
evidence as “mixed” (Jahn et al. 2012, p. F116) or “inconsistent and inconclusive” (de Cuyper 
et al. 2008, p. 26). On this basis, promoting temporary employment legally seems to be 
recommendable, at least if the expectation of positive employment effects is correct. Based on 
data of the German Socio-Economic Panel study (SOEP), we argue that some important 
aspects have to be considered in order to detect the actual well-being effect of contract 
limitation.  The importance of job changes for job satisfaction has to be taken into account as 
they create a “honeymoon-hangover” effect of a new job (Boswell et al. 2005) that biases the 
estimates of the effect of contract limitation on workers’ well-being. Based on this insight, we 




In consequence, allowing contract limitation causes welfare cost that have to be taken into 
account when assessing this flexibilisation instrument, and policy makers should hesitate to 
promote temporary employment. As the impact of flexible labour markets on overall 
employment may depend on country-specific macroeconomic and structural circumstances 
(e.g. OECD 2004, 2011), the welfare cost of allowing contract limitation may indeed exceed 
its benefits in many cases. 
Research in the context of “Flexicurity” policies analyses potential compensators for potential 
welfare costs of flexible labour markets (e.g. Origo and Pagani 2009). This concept implies 
that people are more likely to lose their jobs as employment protection legislation is very 
weak (“flexibility”), but, when they become unemployed, public assistance (“security”) is 
particularly high (e.g. van Vliet and Nijboer 2012). This help consists of financial support 
(e.g. generous unemployment benefits) and active labour market policy. The latter is taken up 
by the European Union that recommends its members to combine flexible labour markets 
with measures supporting the employment prospects of unemployed people (e.g. Council of 
the EU 2008). When successful, such policies may make both the unemployed more 
optimistic to find a job and the employed less fearful of unemployment. Temporary 
employees in such a “flexicure” labour market would suffer less from their limited contract.  
To test this supposition, we enlarge our empirical analysis of temporary employment by the 
aspect of perceived employment security. In contrast to individual job security that describes 
worrying about losing one’s current job, perceived employment security is the self-assessed 
probability to be able to find a new job in case of a job loss. We find no clear evidence that 
good employment prospects affect job satisfaction positively. Thus, active labour market 
policies promoting the employment prospects of jobless people seem ineffective regarding the 
well-being of the employed. Finally, we analyse reasons why contract limitation lowers 
workers’ satisfaction and find that the job security added by a permanent contract mainly 
explains this result. Thus, work-related well-being benefits much more from job security than 
from employment security. 
The study proceeds as follows. In a first step, we develop a theoretical intuition of the impact 
of contract limitation on job satisfaction based on previous research (Section 2). Afterwards, 
we describe the data as well as the empirical identification strategy (Section 3), and present 
some descriptive statistics (Section 4). The results on how contract limitation affects job 
satisfaction are presented in Sections 5 and 6. Thereby, we apply regression models on cross-
sectional data and check the robustness of the results with matching and panel estimation 
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techniques. In Section 7, we enlarge the regression model in order to examine whether the 
impact of a temporary contract on job satisfaction can be compensated by perceived 
employment security. Moreover, we reveal reasons for the negative effect of contract 
limitation on well-being. Finally, we conclude and discuss our findings (Section 8).  
2 Theoretical Considerations and Previous Research  
The most obvious difference between a temporary and a permanent contract is that the former 
needs to be replaced by a subsequent arrangement as the employer-employee relationship 
expires otherwise.1 A permanent employee who does not want to move to another job can 
generally stay in the firm. Of course, this is not always the case, as events such as company 
closure or dismissal may occur. Nevertheless, at any given level of these risks, a permanent 
contract provides additional individual job security, which differs from the situation of those 
employees with a temporary contract. Indeed, Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) show 
empirically that permanent workers feel more secure about their jobs than temporary workers. 
The job security added by a permanent contract may influence workers’ utility at least in two 
ways. Firstly, it enables them to avoid future unemployment. This may affect their well-being 
positively, as losing one’s job has been identified as extremely detrimental to subjective well-
being (e.g. Clark and Oswald 1994, Clark et al. 2008). Secondly, individual job security 
provided by a permanent job may constitute an option value by the opportunity to stay in the 
firm. Even if workers dispose of employment options apart from the present employer, the 
option to stay in the firm enlarges their set of choices. Assume that each additional option 
raises the feeling of autonomy, well-being may benefit, too, as it increases in autonomy (e.g. 
Deci and Ryan 2000). If this holds true, even people who can avoid unemployment when their 
limited contract ends would still prefer an unlimited contract.  
This theoretical view on job security as a positive factor in workers’ well-being is supported 
by previous empirical studies. The review of Sverke et al. (2002) as well as Knabe and Rätzel 
(2010) show that workers are the more satisfied the higher their job security. However, job 
security may not be the only transmission channel from contract limitation to job satisfaction. 
Previous research on temporary employment discusses how firms can use flexible working 
contracts in order to create an incentive scheme and sorting mechanism (e.g. Boockmann and 
Hagen 2008) and thus put more pressure on its temporary workers. Engellandt and Riphahn 
                                                 
1 In this study, we use the terms ‘limited contract’ and ‘fixed-term contract’ as well as ‘flexible working 




(2005) find that temporary employees work more overtime without payment when employers 
use fixed-term contracts as a tool to screen potential candidates for permanent jobs. They 
argue that striving for a permanent contract creates an incentive to do more overtime. Since 
overtime may affect satisfaction with work, it could explain why temporary workers may be 
less satisfied with their jobs than permanent workers. However, evidence provided by de 
Graaf-Zijl (2012) indicates that temporary workers are not less satisfied with working hours 
than permanent workers.   
Since temporary workers can be expected to differ from their permanent colleagues with 
respect to tenure, the type of contract may also affect job satisfaction levels via internal 
relations, as another potential transmission channel. The shorter the contract duration, the 
weaker the incentives for the temporary worker to invest in good relations with others at the 
workplace. The same may apply to the investments of permanent workers in relations to their 
temporary colleagues. In consequence, limited contracts may affect the working climate in a 
negative way and thereby reduce satisfaction with work among (temporary) employees 
(Gallagher and McLean Parks 2001, de Cuyper et al. 2008). In consequence, we consider 
internal relations beyond job security and working overtime as a further potential transmission 
channel through which temporary employment could affect job satisfaction. We address these 
different links in Section 7.  
The theoretical considerations lead to the expectation that temporary workers should be less 
satisfied with their jobs than permanent workers. However, several existing studies 
investigating empirically whether contract limitation lowers workers’ well-being find no 
evidence for any significant impact from temporary contracts on job satisfaction (e.g. Booth 
et al. 2002, Bardasi and Francesconi 2004, Wooden and Warren 2004, Green et al. 2010, 
Green and Heywood 2011, de Graaf-Zijl 2012). Some of these studies show that inferior jobs, 
which are more often temporary than permanent, lower the well-being of employees 
compared to non-inferior jobs. However, these jobs entail a lot of characteristics that are 
neither preferred by workers in permanent nor in fixed-term contracts. Thus, it remains 
unclear whether contract limitation or other unwelcome characteristics explain the measured 
well-being difference between inferior and non-inferior jobs in these studies.  
These inconsistencies between theoretical expectations and previous empirical findings raise 
some scepticism among researchers towards the usefulness of job satisfaction as outcome 
measure for potential welfare cost from flexible working contracts. Pouliakas and 
Theodossiou (2010), for instance, question the standard approach of using subjective 
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evaluations of individual well-being for such purposes after referring to the ambiguous results 
in previous studies. Green et al. (2010) find no significant differences between the job 
satisfaction of permanent and temporary employees but go on by including objective job 
factors in their comparative analysis. Based on a combined job quality index, they come to the 
conclusion that flexible contract workers are worse off. In contrast, we are confident that job 
satisfaction can indeed be used in order to measure workers’ welfare as it explains their 
behaviour very well. This has been shown, inter alia, for job performance (e.g. Harter et al. 
2010), quits (e.g. Clark et al. 1998) and absenteeism (e.g. Wegge et al. 2007).  
3 Data and Methodology 
The following analysis shows how the selection of data and variables are essential in order to 
identify the impact of temporary employment on workers’ satisfaction levels. We use data 
from the SOEP (Wagner et al. 2007) in order to address our research objectives. The SOEP is 
a representative survey of the population in Germany. Each year, about 20,000 individuals 
from 11,000 households are interviewed and provide information on their well-being, income, 
employment status, and much more. Many waves include questions on the workplace. To 
analyse temporary contracts and job satisfaction in equal legal conditions, we restrict our 
SOEP database to the waves from 2001 to 2010. In this period (and also afterwards), the 
German act on part-time work and fixed-term employment (“Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz 
(TzBfG)”) regulates the utilisation of contract limitation in Germany. In general, it allows 
firms to employ workers in fixed-term contracts for two years (§14 TzBfG).2 In addition, 
fixed-term contracts are generally possible if the firm can verify an objective reason for 
contract limitation (e.g. the firm needs the worker’s service only for a certain time).  
A key advantage of using German data is §4 of the TzBfG. According to this rule, any kind of 
discrimination of employees working under fixed-term contracts is prohibited. They have to 
be treated exactly the same as permanent employees with respect to pay and working 
conditions. In general, this also applies to employer-employee agreements over dismissal 
protection (Däubler 2011).  
From a legal point of view, however, temporary workers are more protected compared to 
permanent workers as they cannot be dismissed “regularly” (“ordentliche Kündigung”) when 
their work contract or the collective agreement applying to them does not address this aspect 
                                                 
2 A time limit of four years is possible if the firm is not older than four years. Five years are allowed if the 
worker has been unemployed for at least four months and is at least 52 years old. 
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(§15(3) TzBfG). Dismissals in Germany are considered regular when they fulfil certain legal 
requirements, such as notice periods, and they are often followed by substantial severance 
payments. This considerably weakens the disadvantage of permanent workers that results 
from the rules on regular dismissals compared with temporary workers. Some impact of this 
legal drawback of permanent contracts may nevertheless remain. If true, the effect of contract 
limitation on job satisfaction that we estimate using our German data would be too positive 
compared with its true effect. As we find a negative pattern, this issue does not affect our 
qualitative results.   
In addition, dismissals in Germany can be “extraordinary” (außerordentlich), for instance, 
when workers misbehave severely. This kind of dismissal does not have to fulfil the 
requirements of regular dismissals (notice period, severance payments). The German rules on 
extraordinary dismissals apply equally to temporary and permanent workers.  
Identification strategy 
To identify the impact of fixed-term contracts on job satisfaction, several aspects have to be 
considered as potentially relevant control variables in the multivariate analysis. Thereby, it is 
important to keep in mind that we seek to isolate the pure effect of contract limitation that 
refers to a national policy reform making permanent contracts temporary or vice versa. In 
other words, in this fictional setting workers cannot choose their contract type endogenously. 
However, as such a drastic reform has not taken place, we have to employ data that is sure to 
contain many workers who have chosen their contract voluntarily. Imagine only for the sake 
of the argument that some people in our sample opted for a temporary job as it was better paid 
than a permanent job they could also have chosen. If we do not control for the wage, this 
would bias our results as the estimated “effect” of the temporary contract would also reflect 
the higher wage of these people. In consequence, we have to hold wages constant as well as 
other valued job characteristics such as task variety and learning opportunities.3  
In our investigation period, the 2001 SOEP wave offers the richest set of job characteristics, 
including information on task variety, learning opportunities, and many other aspects. Thus, 
the first step of our empirical analysis is based only on the SOEP wave of 2001 (Section 5). 
However, some job characteristics such as job security, working overtime and internal 
relations might reflect the impact of contract limitation on job satisfaction. Treating these 
aspects as controls would thus be inappropriate (cf. the discussion on “bad controls” by 
                                                 
3 Feldman et al. (1995), Ellingson et al. (1998) as well as Green and Heywood (2011) argue in similar ways. 
 8 
 
Angrist and Pischke 2009). We discuss these factors separately in Section 7, when we shed 
light on reasons for the effect of contract limitation on job satisfaction.  
The fact that many people in our sample may have chosen their contract voluntarily 
influences our identification strategy in a further way that has not been considered by 
previous studies. A recent voluntary job change makes many people extraordinarily happy, 
but only for a short time. Boswell et al. (2005) name this pattern the “honeymoon-hangover” 
effect of a new job. Indeed, temporary workers in our sample are more likely to have changed 
the job recently compared with permanent workers (see Section 4). Thus, they are also more 
likely to still be pleased with the new job they have chosen voluntarily. Thus, we have to 
control for the experience of a recent job change in order to disentangle the effect of contract 
limitation from this joy of a recent voluntary job change. The same argument applies to the 
hangover after this honeymoon experience which could bias the effect of the permanent 
contract negatively. In consequence, we consider tenure as another important control variable 
in our research setting.  
Our underlying econometric model explains the job satisfaction ( iJS ) of a worker i by 
contract type (temporary: 1iTEMP = , permanent: 0iTEMP = ) and a vector of other job 
characteristics ( iW ), including recent job change, tenure and several (un-)popular work 
features. Beyond job characteristics, other differences between workers, such as personality 
traits, age or unemployment experience, are likely to explain both the decision to sign a fixed-
term contract and the level of job satisfaction. Therefore, we include vectors with variables 
for personality ( iP ) and socio-demographic characteristics ( iS ) in the econometric model ( iε
is the error term): 
 
i i i i i iJS TEMP 'W ' P ' S= β + γ + δ + φ + ε     (1) 
In further steps of the empirical analysis, we check the robustness of the standard regression 
results (Section 6). Propensity score estimation techniques account for non-linear influences 
on the assessment of job satisfaction. A panel analysis estimates the effect of contract 
limitation on job satisfaction based on within worker variation. Herewith, all time- 
independent worker characteristics are held equal.  
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The underlying model modifies equation (1) as follows. It considers t as the year of the 
observation, a year fixed effect tµ and an individual-specific fixed effect iτ : 
 
' 'it it it it t i itJS TEMP S W= β + δ + φ +µ + τ ε+      (2) 
 
Sample Restrictions 
In order to compare employees whose contracts are either temporary or permanent, we 
consider only individuals who work for an employer, so that we exclude self-employed 
persons and those who are not employed. As we want to analyse the pure effect of contract 
limitation for people in regular employment, our sample selection differs from previous 
studies by excluding people who have “inferior jobs” such as agency workers, workers who 
take part in workfare schemes and workers with so-called “Mini-Jobs”. We generally drop 
individuals reporting to work below 15 hours a week, apprentices and individuals in other 
forms of occupational education or retraining. We consider typical German working age 
people who are at least 20 years, but not older than 65 years. Some observations drop out 
since they do not provide all the characteristics we consider in the empirical analysis. 
Altogether, we receive a basic sample of 5,769 workers for the cross-sectional analysis based 
on the SOEP wave of 2001. 328 of them have a temporary contract and 5,441 have a 
permanent contract. The sample for the longitudinal analysis relies on the same restrictions. It 
includes 68,286 observations (4,179 fixed-term contracts, 64,107 unlimited contracts) from 
15,080 persons. This number is significantly larger than the one of 2001, due to refreshments 
of the SOEP, additional household members and mobility across employment states, such as 
transitions from unemployment to employment.  
Satisfaction, Contract Limitation and Security 
The SOEP includes many questions on satisfaction with different life domains. One of them 
measures job satisfaction as follows: “Please answer by using the following scale: 0 means 
‘completely dissatisfied’, 10 means ‘completely satisfied’. How satisfied are you with your 
job?” We translate the answers directly into a variable ranging from zero to ten and we 
assume its cardinality in the empirical analysis. This is in line with previous investigations of 
well-being on the basis of SOEP data (e.g. Clark et al. 2008) and refers to the findings of 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004). Moreover, the questionnaire asks about the contract 
type of employed people (temporary or unlimited). We use this question to build a binary 
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variable which is one if the contract is temporary and which is zero if it is unlimited. Another 
question addresses the self-assessment of employment security: “If you lost your job today, 
would it be easy, difficult, or almost impossible for you to find a new position which is at 
least as good as your current one?” Our variable ‘perceived employment security’ is three if 
the respondent answers “easy”, two if “difficult” and one if “impossible”. We additionally 
shed light on individual job security. For this purpose, we use the question “Are you 
concerned about your job security?” The resulting variable takes the value one if people 
answer “very concerned”, two if the answer is “somewhat concerned” and three if the answer 
is “not concerned at all”. In both cases, we generate dummy variables based on the three 
answering options that are used later in the regression analysis. 
Personality 
In the following cross-sectional analysis with SOEP data from 2001, we account for self-
selection into contract type due to personality traits. The “big five”-concept approximates 
someone’s whole personality by five factors, namely extraversion, openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism and agreeableness (e.g. McCrae and Costa 1987). In our 
investigation period, data on these five factors is available for 2005 and 2009. We assume that 
personality traits are stable over a four year period and transfer the big five measures from 
2005 to 2001. This strategy relies on the research of Specht et al. (2011) as well as Lucas and 
Donnellan (2011), who compare the 2005 and 2009 big five outcomes in the SOEP. Their 
results indicate that the stability assumption especially holds true for the age group in our 
sample. Each big five trait is measured by three statements: Respondents assess how much the 
statement applies to themselves on a seven-point-scale (from 1 to 7).4 We build the mean of 
the three answers linked to one trait as the trait’s manifestation. Based on these scores, we 
develop dummy variables for relatively strong/middle/low manifestations of a trait. 
Socio-Demographic Characteristics and Job Characteristics 
Each SOEP wave includes a large body of information about life circumstances. We can 
make use of data on partnership status, education and other factors both in the cross-sectional 
analysis and in the panel analysis. This also applies to some job characteristics such as wage 
and firm size. However, others can be considered in the cross-section only: Task 
characteristics like task variety and independence in carrying out tasks, which are very 
important for job satisfaction (e.g. Warr 1999), are only available in the 2001 data. People 
                                                 




who have a ‘new job’ experienced a job change not longer than approximately one year ago. 
‘Tenure’ is defined as the length of time with the same employer.  
4 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we cast light on general differences between employees with limited contracts 
and unlimited contracts. Thereby, we refer to Table 1 providing descriptive statistics for the 
basic sample of 2001 as described in Section 3. In a second step, we address time-dependent 
changes in job satisfaction and compare those for temporary and permanent employees 
(Figure 1).  
The average satisfaction scores in Table 1 confirm for our cross-sectional data that workers in 
temporary contracts are not significantly less satisfied with their jobs compared to permanent 
workers (7.16 to 7.19). This result seems to be in line with the conclusions drawn from the 
literature review. However, workers with fixed-term contracts state significantly lower job 
security and higher self-assessed employment security compared to workers with permanent 
contracts. The two groups also differ significantly with respect to two of the big five 
personality traits, as temporary employees are more open but less conscientious than 
permanent employees. Moreover, we find significant differences in socio-demographic 
characteristics, since permanently employed workers are older, more often cohabiting, less 
often female, less educated and they have been longer employed as well as shorter 
unemployed in their working life than temporary workers.  
With regard to significantly different job characteristics between the two groups, we find that 
workers with unlimited contracts receive higher net wages, are in higher occupational 
positions, agreed by contract to work more hours and are longer employed within the firm, 
whereas temporary workers state that they are more likely to be promoted in the next time. 
Furthermore, larger shares of permanent employees than of temporary employees work in the 
construction industry, the manufacturing industry and in the financial sector. The opposite 
pattern occurs in the health and social services sector, the education sector as well as the 
agricultural sector. Finally, the work of temporary employees is more strictly monitored and 
there is less freedom of decision concerning task completion. At the same time, temporary 




Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
    Scale Temporary Contract Permanent Contract Difference 
Number of observations: 
 
328 5,441  
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Company size (mean) 1 - 3 2.08 0.65 2.03 0.67 
 
0.05 
Level of occupational autonomy (mean) 1 - 5 2.54 1.09 2.68 1.02  -0.14** 
 








































































































































Risk at work (mean) 1 - 3 1.53 0.73 1.49 0.69 
 
0.04 
          
Source: SOEP 2001, 2005 (Personality)  
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
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Moreover, workers in limited and unlimited contracts are different with respect to their tenure 
and, even more so, with respect to recent job mobility. In fact, more than half of the 
temporary employees report having a new job, which is a remarkably high share. To get an 
impression whether this affects the job satisfaction of temporary and permanent workers 
differently, we use all SOEP data waves within our investigation period from 2001 to 2010 
and employ the same restrictions with respect to age and atypical employment as described in 
Section 3. We follow the same respondents as they move from one job to another. Around this 
event, we define three points in time: 1t = −  as the last SOEP interview in the previous job, 
0t =  as the first interview in the new job and 1t =  as the second interview in the new job. 
The time interval between two interviews is approximately one year.   
We compare job satisfaction for two groups. The first group moves from any contract into a 
temporary one (251 observations). The second group changes from any contract into a 
permanent one (2,085 observations). The type of contract, whether it is a temporary or a 
permanent one, does not change between 0t =  and 1t = . The results are documented in 
Figure 1. As the diagram shows, a honeymoon-hangover effect (see Section 3) appears for 
both groups. This implies that not only in those cases in which individuals move into a new 
job with an unlimited contract but also when a temporary job is taken up, well-being increases 
considerably in comparison with the situation before. Afterwards, there is a strong decline 
from 0t =  to 1t = . For both groups, each of these changes is statistically highly significant. 
While at all three points in time job satisfaction of temporarily and permanently employed 
people differs slightly but not significantly, from both 1t = −  to 0t =  and 0t =  to 1t =  the 
change in happiness seems to be stronger among temporary workers. In other words, the 
honeymoon effect and the hangover effect may be more intense for those with a fixed-term 
contract. In consequence, tenure and being new in a job appear as particularly important 
factors in the following econometric analysis. 
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Source: SOEP 2001-2010 
Note: The red lines (blue lines) always denote temporarily (permanently) employed persons in t=0 and t=1. The 
dashed lines always label 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
5 Multivariate Analysis 
In the following, we present the main results from our investigation of the 2001 data. This 
SOEP wave enables us to test both the effects of contract limitation on job satisfaction and the 
influence of important sets of control variables on this relation (personality, socio-
demographic characteristics, job characteristics). The first step of our econometric analysis is 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of job satisfaction based on the whole sample of 
the 2001 SOEP wave as described above. The results are summarized in Table 2 and reported 
as a whole in the Appendix, Table A1.  
We specify the model (equation (1)) in six steps. In its simplest form, it only includes a 
dummy variable for working in a temporary contract. Accordingly, working in a temporary 
contract is not related to someone’s job satisfaction any differently than working in a 
permanent contract. The second specification adds personality traits and the third 
specification socio-demographic characteristics as controls. These steps do not change the 
regression coefficient of working in a temporary contract notably. Thus, self-selection due to 



















Year around job change 
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the relation of contract limitation and job satisfaction. Table A1 reveals that the big five traits 
affect job satisfaction, as known from previous studies (e.g. Judge et al. 2002). This supports 
our strategy to use the big five measures of 2005 as personality proxies in 2001.  
The regression coefficient of the temporary contract variable becomes much more negative 
when we enlarge the model by job characteristics (Specification 4). However, the effect 
remains insignificant. This finding provides some evidence that keeping job characteristics 
equal is important for identifying the pure effect of contract limitation on job satisfaction. The 
step from the third to the fourth specification increases the explanatory power of the model 
notably (R² increases from about 4% in the second and in the third specification to 15% in the 
fourth specification). This result confirms that job characteristics are very relevant 
determinants of job satisfaction.  
The negative effect of contract limitation on job satisfaction becomes stronger once more 
when we take tenure as well as tenure squared into account (Specification 5). This estimation 
illustrates a relationship of tenure and job satisfaction that is u-shaped, as shown by 
Theodossiou and Zangelidis (2009). This indicates already that considering the honeymoon-
hangover effect of a new job may be important in order to reveal the effect of contract 
limitation on job satisfaction. To take a further step in this direction, we add a binary variable 
for a recent job change (Specification 6). A new job appears to increase the well-being level, 
whereas the tenure-satisfaction relation loses most of its significance. The impact of 
temporary employment on job satisfaction turns out to be clearly negative on a significant 
level. As temporary workers are observed more often in the exceptionally happy period right 
after a job change, the honeymoon-hangover effect biases the coefficient of the temporary 
contract dummy in the first specifications. Revealing the impact of contract limitation on 
employees’ individual welfare requires controlling for the experience of a recent job change. 
 16 
 
Table 2: Summarized Results of the Cross-Section Analysis (Basic Sample, OLS Estimates) 
Model specification: (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Temporary contract  -0.035 -0.006 -0.037 -0.122 -0.196
* -0.235** 
(0.116) (0.115) (0.117) (0.114) (0.116) (0.117) 
Tenure     
-0.027*** -0.017* 
   (0.009) (0.010) 
Tenure²     
0.001** 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
New job      
0.184** 
   
 
(0.082) 
Personality   yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Socio-demographic characteristics   yes  yes  yes  yes  
Job characteristics    yes  yes  yes  
Constant 7.193
*** 7.180*** 7.179*** 6.552*** 6.635*** 6.546*** 
(0.026) (0.037) (0.128) (0.205) (0.208) (0.211) 
Observations 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,769 
Adjusted R² 0.000 0.031 0.037 0.150 0.152 0.152 
 
Source: SOEP 2001, 2005 (Personality) 
Note: *denotes significance at the 10% level, **at the 5% level and ***at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is job satisfaction. Personality includes openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. Socio-demographic characteristics include 
gender, age, migration background, single, educational levels, handicap, unemployment experience and 
employment experience. Job characteristics include firm size, occupational autonomy, industry sector, wage, 
working hours, promotion probability, task variety, hard manual labour, independence in carrying out tasks, 
performance control, shift work, learning opportunities and environmental burden. Complete results are presented 
in Table A1 in the Appendix.   
 
6 Robustness 
The descriptive statistics (Section 4) reveal considerable worker differences related to the two 
contract types. Depending on age, personality or labour market experience, some permanent 
workers in our sample might be extremely unlikely to work in a limited contract. The same 
could apply vice versa to temporary employees. These individuals may not consider contract 
limitation when evaluating their job satisfaction. Having these people in the conceived 
treatment (temporary contract) or control group (permanent contract) can thus bias our results. 
The first econometric model (equation (1)) tries to capture this problem by taking different 
worker characteristics into account. However, the underlying linearity assumption regarding 
the relationship between satisfaction levels and its influencing factors is not necessarily 
appropriate in such a context. We therefore check our results by applying propensity score 
estimation techniques that make treatment and control group even more comparable.  
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We estimate the propensity score ( q ) of being in a fixed-term contract for each observation 
by a probit model based on the worker characteristics (big five personality traits and socio-
demographic characteristics) that are determined before the contract type is chosen.5 
Following our previous insights, we apply this procedure to the basic sample as well as to a 
subsample of people who are not in the first year of a job (in the following: sample without 
novices). The results of these probit estimations are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Sample Trimming and Matching 
As a first check, we trim the basic sample by considering only those people who are at least 
one per cent likely to be in a fixed-term contract and at least one per cent likely to be 
permanently employed ( 0 01q .>  and 0 99q .< ). Thereby, we lose 6.1% of the entire 
population. Afterwards, we run the same regressions from the beginning of this section again. 
The results we present in Table A3 in the Appendix are in line with our previous findings: 
Contract limitation affects job satisfaction negatively as far as we control for personality, 
socio-demographic characteristics, job characteristics, tenure as well as being in the first year 
of a job. The findings from the basic sample with respect to other variables in the model can 
be shown again based on the trimmed sample.     
As a further robustness check, we remove the linearity assumption completely when we apply 
Epanechnikov kernel matching (EKM), which is a widely used propensity score matching 
algorithm, in order to analyse the effect of contract limitation on job satisfaction.6 EKM offers 
the opportunity to calculate bootstrapped standard errors in order to test the significance of the 
estimated effects. The algorithm compares the job satisfaction levels of workers in temporary 
contracts (treated units) with counterfactual outcomes that are constructed by using the 
propensity scores to weight permanent employees (untreated units). The weight of each 
untreated unit depends on the propensity score distance to the treated unit. Note that EKM 
requires that the sample provides permanent employees with similar propensity scores for 
each temporary employee (“overlap assumption”). As Figure A1 and Figure A2 in the 
Appendix illustrate, this condition is fulfilled in the regions of “common support” that are 
restricted samples (of both the basic sample and the sample without novices), including only 
                                                 
5 Note that propensity score matching does not allow to include variables that are determined simultaneously 
with the treatment (such as job characteristics) as covariates in the propensity score estimation. 
6 Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provide a guide on propensity score matching that describes the different 




observations with 0.008 0.514q ≤≤ (basic sample) and 0.004 0.244q ≤≤ (sample without 
novices).  
The average treatment effects on the treated are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix. For the 
basic sample, the EKM estimation leads to a relatively small negative effect of contract 
limitation on job satisfaction which is not statistically significant. This result is in line with 
the first few specifications of the OLS estimation that include similar sets of variables as the 
propensity score estimation. For the sample without novices, however, the effect appears to be 
strongly negative, indicating a considerable negative impact from temporary employment on 
well-being. Both findings are quite robust to the bandwidth selected. Thus, when applying 
EKM, we find a very similar pattern as in the above regressions: A significantly negative 
impact of contract limitation on job satisfaction is identified when the estimation procedure 
considers the honeymoon period of a new job.  
Panel Analysis 
In the cross-sectional analysis, we considered time-independent individual characteristics that 
are likely to influence both the decision to sign a temporary contract and job satisfaction in a 
direct way, via the available information on people’s personality. The common way to deal 
with this issue, however, is to use panel estimation techniques wherever possible. Thanks to 
its panel structure, we can perform an additional robustness check on the basis of our SOEP 
data from 2001 to 2010. The composition of the unbalanced panel is described in Section 3. 
We apply an OLS estimation with individual fixed effects based on equation (2). Since the 
estimated coefficients result from within person variation, all time-independent individual 
characteristics are held equal. The results are summarized in Table 3 and presented in detail in 
Table A5 in the Appendix. The first specification includes only the binary variable for 
working in a temporary contract. In three steps, year dummies (Specification 2), socio-
demographic characteristics (Specification 3), the set of job characteristics that is available in 
each wave between 2001 and 2010 (Specification 4), tenure and tenure squared 
(Specification 5) are added. Thereby, similar patterns appear as in the cross-sectional analysis: 
The more characteristics are taken into account, the more negative contract limitation is 
related to job satisfaction. However, there is no considerable change in explanatory power as 
we enlarge the model with the set of job characteristics that is available in all waves. This 
confirms the important role of the rich set of job-related variables in the 2001 SOEP wave for 
explaining job satisfaction.  
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Table 3: Summarized Results of the Panel Analysis (OLS Fixed Effects Estimates) 
Model Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Temporary contract  0.125
*** 0.065 0.029 0.046 -0.065 -0.121*** 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Tenure     
-0.093*** -0.076*** 
   (0.006) (0.007) 
Tenure²     
0.001*** 0.001*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
New job      
0.243*** 
    
 
(0.028) 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Socio-demographic characteristics   yes  yes  yes  yes  
Job characteristics    yes  yes  yes  
Constant 
7.023*** 7.358*** 8.209*** 7.955*** 8.232*** 8.009*** 
(0.003) (0.020) (0.469) (0.478) (0.473) (0.474) 
Observations 68,286 68,286 68,286 68,286 68,286 68,286 
Number of persons 15,080 15,080 15,080 15,080 15,080 15,080 
Adjusted R² 0.000 0.013 0.017 0.021 0.030 0.032 
 
Source: SOEP 2001-2010 
      Note: *denotes significance at the 10% level, **at the 5% level and ***at the 1% level. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. The dependent variable is job satisfaction. Socio-demographic characteristics include age, 
single, educational levels, handicap, unemployment experience and employment experience. Job characteristics 
include firm size, occupational autonomy, industry sector, wage and working hours. Complete results are 
presented in Table A5 in the Appendix.   
 
Similar to the cross-sectional analysis, when there is no variable in the model addressing a 
recent job change, a significantly negative effect of contract limitation on job satisfaction 
cannot be revealed. Specification 6, however, adds a binary variable for being in the first year 
of a new job. Here, the effect of contract limitation on job satisfaction is much more negative 
than in the previous specifications and turns out to be significant. Just like in the cross-
sectional analysis, we can confirm that being in the first year of a new job enhances job 
satisfaction considerably.  
Altogether, the panel analysis reveals the same results as the cross-sectional analysis. Our 
main findings from the sample of 2001 are robust against time-invariant unobserved worker 
characteristics. Since this wave enables us to take several additional job characteristics into 
account, we use this cross-sectional data again in the following section, where we shed light 
on reasons for the negative impact from contract limitation on job satisfaction and discuss the 




The results presented in the previous sections reveal that contract limitation reduces job 
satisfaction significantly. In the following, we exploit this finding for an assessment of the 
Flexicurity concept and complete our empirical investigation by analysing potential reasons 
why people suffer from contract limitation. Because of the availability of all variables 
required to answer the latter question, we again employ the cross-sectional approach from 
Section 5 on the rich data of the 2001 SOEP wave.  
Flexicurity 
As mentioned above, one variant of the Flexicurity concept recommends the compensation of 
flexibility-induced disutility by active labour market policies aimed at providing employment 
security. We can use the information about perceived employment security (the self-assessed 
ability to find a new job in case of job loss) to test whether this factor plays a role for on-the-
job utility. The estimation procedure is based on the sixth specification presented in Table 2 to 
which we add binary variables that account for low self-assessed employment security and 
high perceived employment security (Specification 7, reference category is medium 
employment security). Table 4 presents the corresponding results.  
According to the results for Specification 7, perceived employment security seems to affect 
workers’ well-being. In particular, the outcome for low perceived employment security 
suggests strongly reduced satisfaction with the job. However, this finding may have multiple 
reasons that do not actually depend on the perceived probability to be able to find a similar 
job. Other aspects, such as job performance, may increase both job satisfaction and perceived 
employment security. To further investigate the role of perceived employment security, we 
therefore keep individual job security (the level of worrying about losing one’s current job) 
constant in the eighth specification (binary variables for high job security and low job 
security, reference category is medium job security). Hereby, we attempt to better isolate the 
effect of perceived employment security from third influences that are related to the current 
job. The results of Specification 8 suggest that perceived employment security appears to be 
of minor relevance only for job satisfaction. 
Surely, one may argue that the coefficients of individual job security and perceived 
employment security are biased, as both variables are highly correlated. However, leaving 
perceived employment security out of the regression, as shown in Specification 9, does not 
change the job security coefficients compared to the previous specification. This speaks in 
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favour of a strong and stable role of job security in workers’ well-being that cannot be altered 
much by perceived employment security. The value of a current job (expressed in the impact 
of job security on job satisfaction) does not depend on the level of employment options 
elsewhere (i.e. perceived employment security). Hence, we find that these two kinds of self-
assessed security are clearly different and that the idea of compensating one with the other 
does not seem promising, based on our empirical figures.  
Transmission Channels 
Adding the job security dummies to the regression in the eighth specification reveals that 
contract limitation mainly affects job satisfaction through its impact on job security. Holding 
job security constant leads to a much smaller and less significant coefficient of the temporary 
contract dummy. This confirms our theoretical explanation that the job security added by 
permanent contracts explains the difference in well-being compared to temporary 
employment. 
To investigate the role of additional factors that may affect the impact of contract limitation 
on job satisfaction, we expand our set of variables by adding overtime as well as relations to 
colleagues and superiors in the final Specification 10.7 The results show that the negative 
impact of temporary employment disappears completely as soon as all transmission channels 
discussed in Section 2 are considered in the model. One interpretation could indeed be that 
colleagues and superiors invest less in relations with temporary workers than with permanent 
workers, as the expected returns decrease in tenure. Of course, the same may apply vice versa 
to the temporary employees and their investments in relations with colleagues and superiors. 
Contrariwise, one can also argue that by controlling for job security, some of the impact from 
other transmission channels is already captured, so that these aspects are in fact more relevant 
than expressed by the outcomes of Specification 10. Hence, while there is good reason to not 
overestimate the role of internal relations and working overtime based on our results, we still 
consider it plausible to argue that temporary contracts may imply more than just job 
insecurity. 
 
                                                 
7 The overtime variable is the natural logarithm of the positive differences between actual and agreed-upon 
working hours. Conflicts with superiors are represented by two binary variables (often having conflicts and 
difficulties with the boss: applies completely vs. not at all, reference category: it applies partly). In the same 
manner, the binary variables constituting relations with colleagues are generated (getting along well with 
colleagues: applies completely vs. not at all, reference category: it applies partly). 
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Table 4: Summarized Results of the Extended Analysis (OLS Estimates) 
Model specification: (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Temporary contract  -0.235
** -0.231** -0.044 -0.039 0.000 
(0.117) (0.117) (0.116) (0.116) (0.108) 
High employment security  
0.106* -0.073 
   (0.060) (0.061)   
Low employment security  
-0.194*** -0.130* 
   (0.075) (0.074)   
High job security   
0.497*** 0.485*** 0.398*** 
  (0.054) (0.053) (0.050) 
Low job security   
-0.680*** -0.690*** -0.661*** 
  (0.095) (0.095) (0.089) 
Overtime (log)     
-0.130*** 
    (0.026) 
Good relations with colleagues     
0.445*** 
    (0.064) 
Bad relations with colleagues     
0.163 
    (0.171) 
No conflicts with superiors     
0.947*** 
    (0.060) 
Often conflicts with superiors     
-0.943*** 
    (0.186) 
Tenure, Tenure², New job yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Personality  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Socio-demographic characteristics yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Job characteristics yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Constant 6.546
*** 6.503*** 6.456*** 6.453*** 5.699*** 
(0.211) (0.211) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) 
Observations 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,769 
Adjusted R² 0.152 0.154 0.184 0.184 0.258 
 
Source: SOEP 2001, 2005 (Personality) 
Note: *denotes significance at the 10% level, **at the 5% level and ***at the 1% level. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is job satisfaction. Personality includes openness to 
experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. Socio-demographic 
characteristics include gender, age, migration background, single, educational levels, handicap, 
unemployment experience and employment experience. Job characteristics include firm size, 
occupational autonomy, industry sector, wage, working hours, promotion probability, task variety, 
hard manual labour, independence in carrying out tasks, performance control, shift work, learning 





8 Discussion and Conclusion 
Several studies have investigated the well-being effects of temporary contracts compared with 
permanent contracts, but could not establish a clear pattern. Of course, this ambiguity could 
be used to justify the legal promotion of limited contracts. However, it is interesting to note 
that researchers in the past have been very reluctant to interpret their findings in such a way. 
This scepticism may come from the contrast between theoretical expectation and empirical 
findings. The present study, however, is able to establish a clear pattern that allows drawing 
cautious policy implications.  
In contrast to former research, we develop an identification strategy that explicitly accounts 
for the honeymoon-hangover effect of a new job. Based on this, we apply several empirical 
techniques to German panel data and find that temporary contracts lead to lower job 
satisfaction compared with permanent contracts. Since we can detect psychological costs from 
temporary contracts, our results reject previous findings on the impact of this flexibilisation 
measure. This key finding answers the question ‘flexibilisation without hesitation?’ that is 
raised based on the review of the existing literature with a clear ‘no’.  
With respect to labour market policy, our findings allow us to draw several conclusions. Even 
if labour market flexibilisation with respect to temporary employment would succeed in 
generating more jobs, the welfare losses among the employed must be considered as well. In 
developed countries, for instance, flexible labour markets seem neither to increase 
employment nor to reduce unemployment significantly (e.g. OECD 2011). Based on our 
findings, it is plausible to argue that in these countries the welfare cost of fostering limited 
contracts may predominate its benefits. This conclusion is additionally supported by evidence 
documenting that the life satisfaction of the average citizen in Western Europe is the higher 
the more employment is legally protected (Ochsen and Welsch 2012).  
However, this conclusion is limited in several ways. Firstly, we compare employment effects 
of flexible labour markets with welfare effects of only one flexibilisation measure. It is 
possible that promoting temporary employment has different employment effects than other 
flexibilisation measures. Secondly, the focus on employed and unemployed people is not 
necessarily sufficient, as it is plausible that other aspects, such as the social security system, 
are affected by promoting temporary employment. In consequence, other groups that we do 
not consider might benefit or suffer from such a reform.  
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If policymakers nevertheless favour promoting contract limitation, our results confirm the 
underlying assumption of the “Flexicurity” concept that workers suffer from labour market 
flexibility, at least with respect to temporary contracts. In this context, we tested whether an 
effective active labour market policy that increases self-assessed employment security can 
serve as a plausible equaliser, as recommended by the Council of the EU (2008). We find that 
perceived employment security does not enhance job satisfaction in the way that job security 
does. Hence, our results suggest that perceived employment security is not able to compensate 
workers for the loss in individual job security. Moreover, the latter appears to be the main 
transmission channel through which temporary contracts affect workers’ well-being.  
This result is open to multiple interpretations. On the one hand, the prospect of staying in a 
current job may contribute more to subjective well-being than aspects that can be substituted 
more easily, such as employment status or income. Jahoda (1981) emphasises that, inter alia, 
social contracts and daily routines are general assets of working. With this in mind, the 
additional values of a current job might be stable social relations and habitual daily routines. 
On the other hand, our approach might not be able to capture the whole impact of 
employment security on individual welfare, as job satisfaction is not global enough to 
measure it. An alternative instrument would be life satisfaction. 
Beyond these main results, our study confirms the importance of being new in a job for the 
determination of workers’ well-being levels. If having to explain why researchers in the past 
could not confirm expectations of disutility effects from temporary contracts empirically, we 
can first and foremost point to the important influence of the so-called honeymoon-hangover 
effect of job changes on job satisfaction. Neglecting this phenomenon can be made 
responsible for the inconclusive assessment of the impact of temporary employment on 
workers’ subjective well-being. Our analysis shows this pattern for both temporary and 
permanent employees, according to which, after an exceptionally happy first period in a new 
position, job satisfaction decreases considerably. Hence, our results confirm the findings of 
Boswell et al. (2005) for a sample of managers. Likewise, other researchers who analyse job 
satisfaction as an outcome or as a predictor of behaviour should be aware of this phenomenon. 
Regarding our main research objective, the honeymoon-hangover effect leads to an 
overestimation of the job satisfaction of people with fixed-term contracts. Correcting for this 
impact reveals the inferiority of temporary contracts which deprive workers of the most 
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Table A1: Results of the Linear Regression (Basic Sample, OLS Estimates) 
Model specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Temporary contract -0.035 -0.006 -0.037 -0.122 -0.196* -0.235** 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.117) (0.114) (0.116) (0.117) 
High openness to experience 
 
0.169** 0.179** 0.106 0.102 0.099 
  
(0.081) (0.081) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Low openness to experience 
 
-0.011 -0.004 0.131* 0.133* 0.137* 
  
(0.078) (0.077) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
High neuroticism 
 
-0.498*** -0.461*** -0.313*** -0.323*** -0.326*** 
  
(0.109) (0.109) (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) 
Low neuroticism 
 
0.558*** 0.534*** 0.379*** 0.382*** 0.380*** 
  
(0.072) (0.072) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
High agreeableness 
 
0.197** 0.210*** 0.219*** 0.226*** 0.222*** 
  
(0.078) (0.077) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Low agreeableness 
 
-0.258*** -0.275*** -0.244*** -0.246*** -0.245*** 
  
(0.087) (0.087) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
High conscientiousness 
 
0.207*** 0.224*** 0.201*** 0.195*** 0.198*** 
  
(0.067) (0.067) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Low conscientiousness 
 
-0.284*** -0.277*** -0.244*** -0.238*** -0.237*** 
  
(0.091) (0.091) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
High extraversion 
 
-0.150* -0.155* -0.121 -0.121 -0.123 
  
(0.084) (0.085) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Low extraversion 
 
-0.287*** -0.277*** -0.252*** -0.247*** -0.250*** 
  
(0.085) (0.085) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Education, primary level 
  
-0.212** -0.067 -0.058 -0.059 
   
(0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
Education, tertiary level 
  
0.006 -0.238*** -0.258*** -0.256*** 
   
(0.058) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Handicap 
  
-0.448*** -0.411*** -0.403*** -0.401*** 
   
(0.130) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) 
Single 
  
-0.010 0.004 0.011 0.006 
   
(0.075) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Migration background 
  
0.122* 0.254*** 0.252*** 0.254*** 
   
(0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Female 
  
-0.066 -0.000 0.006 0.006 
   
(0.053) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Age, difference to 40 years 
  
-0.010 -0.015** -0.014** -0.014** 
   
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age, difference to 40 years, squared 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years of unemployment 
  
-0.037* 0.001 -0.014 -0.015 
   
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Years of employment 
  
0.003 0.010* 0.014** 0.014** 
   
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Promotion probability 0% 
   
-0.157** -0.142** -0.130* 
    
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Promotion prob. >0% but ≤ 30% 
   
-0.150** -0.143** -0.137** 
    
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
Promotion probability ≥70% 
   
0.268*** 0.264*** 0.266*** 
    
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
Small company 
   
0.065 0.046 0.043 
    
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Big company 
   
0.004 0.022 0.020 
    
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Occupational autonomy, level 2 -0.007 0.005 0.010 
    (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
Occupational autonomy, level 3    -0.172* -0.152 -0.149 
    (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) 
Occupational autonomy, level 4    -0.088 -0.073 -0.070 
    (0.120) (0.121) (0.121) 
Occupational autonomy, level 5    -0.012 0.007 0.021 
    (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) 
log net wage 
   
0.186** 0.228*** 0.224*** 
    
(0.082) (0.083) (0.084) 
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Model specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Work hours, difference to 40 
   
-0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
    
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Banking and insurance 
   
-0.131 -0.099 -0.099 
    
(0.137) (0.138) (0.138) 
Transport 
   
0.154 0.171 0.168 
    
(0.140) (0.139) (0.139) 
Trade 
   
-0.159 -0.155 -0.155 
    
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
Agriculture 
   
0.532** 0.560** 0.567** 
 
   
(0.235) (0.237) (0.237) 
Mining 
   
0.050 0.094 0.091 
 
   
(0.225) (0.225) (0.226) 
Energy 
   
-0.190 -0.122 -0.132 
 
   
(0.420) (0.422) (0.422) 
Manufacturing 
   
0.169* 0.185* 0.184* 
 
   
(0.096) (0.097) (0.097) 
Construction 
   
0.169* 0.181* 0.183* 
 
   
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Education 
   
0.312** 0.351*** 0.346*** 
 
   
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) 
Public administration 
   
0.271** 0.312*** 0.311*** 
 
   
(0.109) (0.110) (0.110) 
Health and social services 
   
0.212* 0.243** 0.246** 
 
   
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) 
High task variety 
   
0.529*** 0.520*** 0.517*** 
 
   
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Low task variety 
   
-0.533*** -0.537*** -0.538*** 
 
   
(0.159) (0.158) (0.159) 
Very hard manual labour 
   
-0.386*** -0.394*** -0.393*** 
 
   
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
No hard manual labour 
   
0.013 0.007 0.005 
 
   
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
High independence 
   
0.310*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 
 
   
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Low independence 
   
0.218*** 0.210** 0.209** 
 
   
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
Strong performance control 
   
-0.200*** -0.200*** -0.204*** 
 
   
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Weak performance control 
   
0.183*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 
 
   
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Often shift work 
   
0.034 0.043 0.042 
 
   
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
No shift work 
   
-0.049 -0.045 -0.044 
 
   
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Good learning opportunities 
   
0.416*** 0.408*** 0.405*** 
 
   
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Bad learning opportunities 
   
-0.364*** -0.362*** -0.362*** 
 
   
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
High environmental burden at work 
   
-0.127 -0.126 -0.129 
 
   
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
No environmental burden at work 
   
0.189*** 0.182*** 0.178*** 
 
   
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
Very annoying tasks 
   
-0.547*** -0.541*** -0.538*** 
 
   
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Not annoying tasks 
   
0.366*** 0.363*** 0.357*** 
 
   
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
Very risk at work 
   
-0.006 -0.003 -0.004 
 
   
(0.101) (0.101) (0.100) 
No risk at work 
   
-0.013 -0.013 -0.012 
 
   
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) 
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Model specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tenure 
    
-0.027*** -0.017* 
 
    
(0.009) (0.010) 
Tenure² 
    
0.001** 0.000 
 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
New job 
     
0.184** 
 
     
(0.082) 
Constant 7.193*** 7.180*** 7.179*** 6.552*** 6.635*** 6.546*** 
 (0.026) (0.037) (0.128) (0.205) (0.208) (0.211) 
Observations 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,769 
Adjusted R² 0.000 0.031 0.037 0.150 0.152 0.152 
       
Source: SOEP 2001, 2005 (Personality) 
     Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 





Table A2: Propensity Score Estimations (Probit) 
Sample: basic no novices 
  coefficient standard error coefficient standard error 
High openness to experience 0.099 (0.087) 0.038 (0.124) 
Low openness to experience -0.092 (0.094) -0.055 (0.122) 
High neuroticism 0.035 (0.102) -0.057 (0.151) 
Low neuroticism -0.170* (0.096) -0.153 (0.132) 
High agreeableness 0.051 (0.087) -0.203 (0.138) 
Low agreeableness -0.160 (0.102) -0.166 (0.138) 
High conscientiousness -0.062 (0.080) -0.116 (0.114) 
Low conscientiousness 0.135 (0.095) -0.014 (0.131) 
High extraversion 0.101 (0.086) 0.054 (0.125) 
Low extraversion 0.025 (0.093) 0.147 (0.118) 
Years of unemployment 0.150*** (0.020) 0.073** (0.034) 
Years of employment -0.038*** (0.007) -0.035*** (0.010) 
Education, primary level -0.155 (0.105) -0.278* (0.167) 
Education, tertiary level 0.153** (0.065) 0.217** (0.087) 
Handicap 0.137 (0.132) 0.312** (0.159) 
Single -0.012 (0.078) 0.081 (0.104) 
Migration background -0.090 (0.078) -0.203* (0.116) 
Female 0.041 (0.059) 0.041 (0.080) 
Age, difference to 40 0.002 (0.007) -0.003 (0.010) 
Age, difference to 40, squared 0.001*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
Constant -1.248*** (0.144) -1.525*** (0.199) 
Observations 5,769 4,906 
     Source: SOEP 2001, 2005 (Personality) 
   Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are in 







Table A3: Complete Results of the Linear Regression (Trimmed Sample, OLS Estimates) 
Model specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Temporary contract -0.031 -0.007 -0.041 -0.124 -0.201* -0.240** 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.117) (0.115) (0.117) (0.118) 
High openness to experience 
 
0.160* 0.171** 0.085 0.081 0.078 
  
(0.083) (0.083) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) 
Low openness to experience 
 
0.017 0.018 0.161** 0.165** 0.169** 
  
(0.083) (0.083) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
High neuroticism 
 
-0.502*** -0.464*** -0.313*** -0.324*** -0.327*** 
  
(0.113) (0.113) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
Low neuroticism 
 
0.509*** 0.476*** 0.327*** 0.330*** 0.327*** 
  
(0.077) (0.077) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
High agreeableness 
 
0.191** 0.208** 0.205*** 0.212*** 0.208*** 
  
(0.081) (0.081) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Low agreeableness 
 
-0.263*** -0.290*** -0.253*** -0.255*** -0.254*** 
  
(0.093) (0.093) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
High conscientiousness 
 
0.218*** 0.237*** 0.239*** 0.235*** 0.237*** 
  
(0.070) (0.070) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Low conscientiousness 
 
-0.273*** -0.258*** -0.229** -0.224** -0.223** 
  
(0.093) (0.093) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
High extraversion 
 
-0.132 -0.137 -0.111 -0.108 -0.111 
  
(0.086) (0.087) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
Low extraversion 
 
-0.312*** -0.301*** -0.267*** -0.262*** -0.265*** 
  
(0.090) (0.090) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) 
Education, primary level 
  
-0.209** -0.055 -0.049 -0.050 
   
(0.099) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Education, tertiary level 
  
0.023 -0.219*** -0.239*** -0.236*** 
   
(0.058) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Handicap 
  
-0.401*** -0.375*** -0.372*** -0.369*** 
   
(0.134) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
Single 
  
-0.025 -0.009 -0.003 -0.007 
   
(0.077) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) 
Migration background 
  
0.141* 0.256*** 0.255*** 0.258*** 
   
(0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Female 
  
-0.062 -0.008 -0.002 -0.002 
   
(0.054) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Age, difference to 40 years 
  
-0.010 -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** 
   
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age, difference to 40 years, squared 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years of unemployment 
  
-0.040* -0.001 -0.016 -0.017 
   
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Years of employment 
  
0.001 0.009 0.012* 0.012* 
   
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Promotion probability 0% 
   
-0.148** -0.132* -0.120* 
    
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
Promotion prob. >0% but ≤ 30% 
   
-0.153** -0.146** -0.139** 
    
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Promotion probability ≥70% 
   
0.243** 0.240** 0.242** 
    
(0.102) (0.102) (0.101) 
Small company 
   
0.058 0.037 0.034 
    
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
Big company 
   
0.016 0.035 0.033 
    
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Occupational autonomy, level 2 -0.020 -0.010 -0.004 
    (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Occupational autonomy, level 3    -0.171 -0.153 -0.150 
    (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) 
Occupational autonomy, level 4    -0.144 -0.133 -0.130 
    (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) 
Occupational autonomy, level 5    -0.083 -0.070 -0.055 
    (0.199) (0.200) (0.200) 
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Model specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log net wage    0.210** 0.248*** 0.244*** 
    (0.085) (0.086) (0.087) 
Work hours, difference to 40    -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Banking and insurance 
   
-0.138 -0.110 -0.110 
    
(0.139) (0.139) (0.139) 
Transport 
   
0.187 0.202 0.197 
    
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) 
Trade 
   
-0.129 -0.127 -0.126 
    
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) 
Agriculture 
   
0.494* 0.508* 0.518* 
    
(0.263) (0.265) (0.266) 
Mining 
   
0.185 0.224 0.221 
    
(0.225) (0.225) (0.225) 
Energy 
   
-0.150 -0.092 -0.102 
    
(0.429) (0.431) (0.431) 
Manufacturing 
   
0.187* 0.200** 0.199** 
    
(0.100) (0.101) (0.101) 
Construction 
   
0.181* 0.190* 0.192* 
    
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
Education 
   
0.349*** 0.383*** 0.378*** 
    
(0.124) (0.125) (0.125) 
Public administration 
   
0.309*** 0.347*** 0.347*** 
    
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) 
Health and social services 
   
0.244** 0.275** 0.278** 
    
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115) 
High task variety 
   
0.558*** 0.549*** 0.546*** 
    
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Low task variety 
   
-0.506*** -0.513*** -0.514*** 
    
(0.166) (0.166) (0.166) 
Very hard manual labour 
   
-0.408*** -0.416*** -0.415*** 
    
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
No hard manual labour 
   
0.018 0.011 0.009 
    
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
High independence 
   
0.315*** 0.316*** 0.316*** 
    
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Low independence 
   
0.227** 0.220** 0.219** 
    
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
Strong performance control 
   
-0.197** -0.199** -0.203** 
    
(0.081) (0.080) (0.080) 
Weak performance control 
   
0.159*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 
    
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Often shift work 
   
0.027 0.037 0.035 
    
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) 
No shift work 
   
-0.022 -0.015 -0.015 
    
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
Good learning opportunities 
   
0.437*** 0.428*** 0.426*** 
    
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Bad learning opportunities 
   
-0.364*** -0.363*** -0.363*** 
    
(0.088) (0.089) (0.089) 
High environmental burden at work 
   
-0.119 -0.117 -0.121 
    
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
No environmental burden at work 
   
0.187*** 0.179** 0.175** 
    
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
Very annoying tasks 
   
-0.579*** -0.574*** -0.571*** 
    
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Not annoying tasks 
   
0.347*** 0.341*** 0.336*** 
    
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Very risk at work 
   
0.024 0.027 0.025 
    
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
No risk at work 
   
0.009 0.008 0.009 
    
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
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Model specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tenure 
    
-0.030*** -0.019* 
     
(0.009) (0.010) 
Tenure² 
    
0.001*** 0.000 
     
(0.000) (0.000) 
New job 
     
0.191** 
      
(0.083) 
Constant 7.187*** 7.182*** 7.199*** 6.507*** 6.610*** 6.515*** 
 (0.027) (0.038) (0.134) (0.213) (0.216) (0.220) 
Observations 5,367 5,367 5,367 5,367 5,367 5,367 
Adjusted R² 0.000 0.028 0.034 0.152 0.154 0.154 
       
Source: SOEP 2001, 2005 (Personality) 
     Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  





Table A4: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (Kernel Matching)  
Outcome variable: Job satisfaction   
 Basic sample Sample without novices 
Treated (temporary contract) [n = 328] [n = 143] 
Controls (permanent contract) [n = 5,219] [n = 4,348] 
   
Epanechnikov kernel,  






Epanechnikov kernel,  






Epanechnikov kernel,  







Source: SOEP 2001, 2005 (Personality) 
Notes: Average treatment effects on the treated show differences in job satisfaction levels between temporary and permanent workers. 





Table A5: Complete Results of the Panel Analysis (OLS Fixed Effects Estimates) 
Model Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Temporary contract 0.125*** 0.065 0.029 0.046 -0.065 -0.121*** 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Year 2002 
 
-0.147*** -0.094** -0.098** -0.091** -0.096** 
  
(0.024) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Year 2003 
 
-0.167*** -0.060 -0.064 -0.043 -0.052 
  
(0.025) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Year 2004 
 
-0.291*** -0.129 -0.133 -0.099 -0.116 
  
(0.027) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) 
Year 2005 
 
-0.349*** -0.133 -0.140 -0.088 -0.112 
  
(0.028) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) 
Year 2006 
 
-0.406*** -0.134 -0.138 -0.068 -0.099 
  
(0.029) (0.152) (0.153) (0.152) (0.152) 
Year 2007 
 
-0.453*** -0.125 -0.129 -0.047 -0.090 
  
(0.029) (0.181) (0.182) (0.181) (0.181) 
Year 2008 
 
-0.484*** -0.098 -0.105 -0.018 -0.068 
  
(0.030) (0.212) (0.213) (0.212) (0.212) 
Year 2009 
 
-0.561*** -0.120 -0.130 -0.034 -0.091 
  
(0.032) (0.241) (0.243) (0.241) (0.241) 
Year 2010 
 
-0.592*** -0.094 -0.111 -0.004 -0.061 
  
(0.033) (0.272) (0.274) (0.272) (0.272) 
Education, primary level 
  
-0.427* -0.363 -0.360 -0.355 
   
(0.226) (0.223) (0.225) (0.225) 
Education, tertiary level 
  
-0.075 -0.154 -0.187* -0.201* 
   
(0.104) (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) 
Handicap 
  
-0.201*** -0.198*** -0.194*** -0.195*** 
   
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Single 
  
0.155*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.155*** 
   
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
Age, difference to 40, squared 
  
-0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years of unemployment 
  
0.325*** 0.345*** 0.132** 0.138** 
   
(0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) 
Years of employment 
  
-0.059** -0.070** -0.042 -0.037 
   
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Banking and insurance 
   
0.155 0.193 0.189 
    
(0.130) (0.130) (0.130) 
Transport 
   
0.016 0.029 0.030 
    
(0.097) (0.096) (0.095) 
Trade 
   
-0.161** -0.118* -0.116* 
    
(0.072) (0.070) (0.070) 
Agriculture 
   
0.248 0.215 0.208 
    
(0.171) (0.171) (0.171) 
Mining 
   
0.322** 0.347** 0.348** 
    
(0.158) (0.156) (0.156) 
Energy 
   
-0.079 -0.083 -0.091 
    
(0.291) (0.288) (0.290) 
Manufacturing 
   
-0.012 0.016 0.016 
    
(0.064) (0.063) (0.063) 
Construction 
   
-0.044 -0.002 -0.004 
    
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067) 
Education Sector 
   
0.277*** 0.287*** 0.287*** 
    
(0.101) (0.098) (0.098) 
Public administration 
   
0.179** 0.184** 0.186** 
    
(0.080) (0.078) (0.078) 
Health and social services 
   
0.129 0.131 0.132 
    
(0.085) (0.084) (0.084) 
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Model Specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Small company 
   
-0.127*** -0.143*** -0.150*** 
    
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
Big company 
   
0.071** 0.083** 0.086*** 
    
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
Occupational autonomy, level 2    0.175*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 
    (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Occupational autonomy, level 3    0.339*** 0.361*** 0.362*** 
    (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) 
Occupational autonomy, level 4    0.460*** 0.492*** 0.489*** 
    (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Occupational autonomy, level 5    0.655*** 0.686*** 0.682*** 
    (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) 
log net wage 
   
0.352*** 0.371*** 0.379*** 
    
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Work hours, difference to 40 
   
-0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
    
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tenure 
    
-0.093*** -0.076*** 
     
(0.006) (0.007) 
Tenure² 
    
0.001*** 0.001*** 
     
(0.000) (0.000) 
New Job 
     
0.243*** 
      
(0.028) 
Constant 7.023*** 7.358*** 8.209*** 7.955*** 8.232*** 8.009*** 
  (0.003) (0.020) (0.469) (0.478) (0.473) (0.474) 
Observations 68,286 68,286 68,286 68,286 68,286 68,286 
Number of persons 15,080 15,080 15,080 15,080 15,080 15,080 
Adjusted R² 0.000 0.013 0.017 0.021 0.030 0.032 
 
Source: SOEP 2001-2010 
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are in 





Table A6: Complete Results of the Extended Analysis (OLS Estimates) 
Model specification: (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Temporary contract -0.235** -0.231** -0.044 -0.039 0.000 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.116) (0.116) (0.108) 
High openness to experience 0.099 0.099 0.098 0.098 0.117 
 (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.072) 
Low openness to experience 0.137* 0.141* 0.139* 0.135* 0.077 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.071) (0.071) (0.069) 
High neuroticism -0.326*** -0.312*** -0.306*** -0.308*** -0.215** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.098) (0.099) (0.092) 
Low neuroticism 0.380*** 0.366*** 0.302*** 0.305*** 0.217*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.066) 
High agreeableness 0.222*** 0.224*** 0.227*** 0.230*** 0.186*** 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.069) 
Low agreeableness -0.245*** -0.243*** -0.237*** -0.236*** -0.117 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.079) (0.079) (0.076) 
High conscientiousness 0.198*** 0.195*** 0.185*** 0.187*** 0.148** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.058) 
Low conscientiousness -0.237*** -0.230*** -0.231*** -0.233*** -0.179** 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.085) (0.085) (0.082) 
High extraversion -0.123 -0.126 -0.148* -0.152** -0.133* 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.073) 
Low extraversion -0.250*** -0.244*** -0.234*** -0.232*** -0.227*** 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.076) 
Education, primary level -0.059 -0.060 -0.083 -0.086 -0.072 
 
(0.087) (0.087) (0.085) (0.085) (0.081) 
Education, tertiary level -0.256*** -0.252*** -0.198*** -0.201*** -0.136** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.062) 
Handicap -0.401*** -0.379*** -0.385*** -0.399*** -0.345*** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.118) (0.118) (0.113) 
Single 0.006 0.009 -0.023 -0.021 -0.002 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.066) 
Migration background 0.254*** 0.244*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.160** 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.066) 
Female 0.006 0.010 0.000 0.001 -0.052 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.060) 
Age, difference to 40 years -0.014** -0.012* -0.015** -0.015** -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age, difference to 40 years, squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years of unemployment -0.015 -0.013 -0.004 -0.003 -0.011 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
Years of employment 0.014** 0.015** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Promotion probability 0% -0.130* -0.117 -0.112 -0.117* -0.093 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.069) (0.067) 
Promotion prob. >0% but ≤ 30% -0.137** -0.134* -0.132** -0.131* -0.106 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.068) (0.065) 
Promotion probability ≥70% 0.266*** 0.262*** 0.188* 0.178* 0.164* 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.095) 
Small company 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.048 0.027 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.062) 
Big company 0.020 0.031 0.003 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.056) Occupational autonomy, level 2 0.010 0.000 -0.013 -0.014 0.014 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.090) (0.090) (0.086) 
Occupational autonomy, level 3 -0.149 -0.155 -0.197* -0.200* -0.083 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.102) (0.103) (0.097) 
Occupational autonomy, level 4 -0.070 -0.082 -0.138 -0.136 0.043 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.119) (0.119) (0.114) 
Occupational autonomy, level 5 0.021 0.005 -0.078 -0.085 0.185 
 (0.195) (0.195) (0.189) (0.189) (0.176) 
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Model specification: (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
log net wage 0.224*** 0.217*** 0.117 0.114 0.137* 
 (0.084) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) (0.077) 
Work hours, difference to 40 -0.006 -0.005 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Banking and insurance -0.099 -0.119 -0.068 -0.063 -0.046 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.136) (0.136) (0.128) 
Transport 0.168 0.167 0.245* 0.246* 0.216* 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.133) (0.133) (0.123) 
Trade -0.155 -0.159 -0.075 -0.071 -0.013 
 (0.106) (0.105) (0.104) (0.104) (0.098) 
Agriculture 0.567** 0.582** 0.650*** 0.662*** 0.567*** 
 (0.237) (0.237) (0.223) (0.223) (0.207) 
Mining -0.132 -0.086 0.159 0.151 0.119 
 (0.422) (0.425) (0.412) (0.409) (0.370) 
Energy 0.091 0.129 0.290 0.282 0.174 
 (0.226) (0.226) (0.225) (0.224) (0.215) 
Manufacturing 0.184* 0.188* 0.267*** 0.272*** 0.274*** 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.095) (0.095) (0.089) 
Construction 0.183* 0.190* 0.280*** 0.285*** 0.295*** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.094) 
Education 0.346*** 0.362*** 0.357*** 0.362*** 0.292** 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.116) 
Public administration 0.311*** 0.340*** 0.257** 0.255** 0.220** 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.108) (0.108) (0.103) 
Health and social services 0.246** 0.243** 0.231** 0.235** 0.228** 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.112) (0.112) (0.105) 
High task variety 0.517*** 0.519*** 0.481*** 0.480*** 0.413*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.053) 
Low task variety -0.538*** -0.537*** -0.507*** -0.509*** -0.468*** 
 (0.159) (0.158) (0.154) (0.155) (0.146) 
Very hard manual labour -0.393*** -0.399*** -0.304*** -0.306*** -0.297*** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.079) 
No hard manual labour 0.005 0.011 0.016 0.014 -0.027 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.061) 
High independence 0.311*** 0.314*** 0.301*** 0.297*** 0.263*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) 
Low independence 0.209** 0.208** 0.193** 0.194** 0.118 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.083) (0.078) 
Strong performance control -0.204*** -0.202*** -0.136* -0.136* -0.089 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.073) 
Weak performance control 0.188*** 0.179*** 0.100* 0.098* 0.002 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) 
Often shift work 0.042 0.053 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.106) (0.106) (0.102) 
No shift work -0.044 -0.043 -0.081 -0.082 -0.121 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.093) (0.093) (0.090) 
Good learning opportunities 0.405*** 0.396*** 0.421*** 0.419*** 0.356*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.050) 
Bad learning opportunities -0.362*** -0.365*** -0.361*** -0.363*** -0.334*** 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.083) (0.079) 
High environmental burden at work -0.129 -0.131 -0.128 -0.127 -0.058 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.081) 
No environmental burden at work 0.178*** 0.173** 0.162** 0.163** 0.147** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.064) 
Very annoying tasks -0.538*** -0.536*** -0.468*** -0.472*** -0.312*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.057) 
Not annoying tasks 0.357*** 0.352*** 0.306*** 0.308*** 0.181*** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.065) 
Very risk at work -0.004 -0.005 -0.020 -0.021 0.012 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.098) (0.099) (0.094) 
No risk at work -0.012 -0.012 -0.021 -0.021 -0.076 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.064) 
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Model specification: (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tenure -0.017* -0.015 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Tenure² 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
New job 0.184** 0.185** 0.209*** 0.206** 0.142* 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (0.076) 
High job security 
  
0.497*** 0.485*** 0.398*** 
   
(0.054) (0.053) (0.050) 
Low job security 
  
-0.680*** -0.690*** -0.661*** 
   
(0.095) (0.095) (0.089) 
Overtime (log) 
    
-0.130*** 
     
(0.026) 
Good relations with colleagues 
    
0.445*** 
     
(0.064) 
Bad relations with colleagues 
    
0.163 
     
(0.171) 
No conflicts with superiors 
    
0.947*** 
     
(0.060) 
Often conflicts with superiors 
    
-0.943*** 
     
(0.186) 












  Constant 6.546*** 6.503*** 6.456*** 6.453*** 5.699*** 
 (0.211) (0.211) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) 
Observations 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,769 
R² 0.152 0.154 0.184 0.184 0.258 
      Source: SOEP 2001, 2005 (Personality) 
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are in 
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